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REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
1990/2 — Éditions BRUYLANT, Bruxelles

MILITARY NECESSITY
AND IRAQI DESTRUCTION
OF KUWAITI OIL
BY

Rex J. ZEDALIS (*)
I
The extent of the destruction inflicted on the Kuwaiti oil industry by the
Iraqi armed forces during its seven month occupation of Kuwait was
indeed massive. Estimâtes suggest that between 80-85 percent of the country’s 950 oil wells were damaged or destroyed (1). In the Greater Burgan
field itself, which lies just outside the capital of Kuwait City, every one of
the 684 operating wells was dynamited (2). In excess of 500 wells continue
to burn (3). Many others pour noxious gases into the air or lakes of oil onto
the surrounding landscape (4). The current rate of loss to fïre alone is 4.55 million barrels per day (bpd) (5), as much as Japan consumes every
day (6) and twice what is used on a daily basis in West Germany (7). It
may take 2 years or more to extinguish ail the blazes (8) and cost as much
as $ 5 billion (9). Efforts fix the total amount of crude oil to be lost by
Kuwait at no less than 9 billion barrels, 10 percent of Kuwait’s reser
ves (10), or 1 percent of the world’s total reserves (11). And the environmental damage suffered by the Persian Gulf aquahabitat as a resuit of the
(*) Professor o f Law, University of Tulsa ; W.B. Cutting Fellow (1980-1981), J.S.D. (1987)
Columbia University ; Associate Director, National Energy Law and Policy Institute (1982-1983,
1984-1986).
(1) See L o r c h , «Burning Wells Turn Kuwait into Land of Oily Blackness », N .Y . Times,
Mar. 6, A -l, col. 5, at A-7, col. 5.
(2) Id., at A -l, col. 5.
(3) See I b r a h i m , «Eires Could Burn for Up to 2 Years», N .Y . Times, Mar. 16, 1991, at A-4,
col. 1.
(4) See Tulsa World, Mar. 23, 1991, at B-6, col. 2.
(5) See I b r a h i m , «Slow Recovery is Seen for Kuwait and Iraq Oil», N .Y. Times, Mar. 21,
1991, at C-2, col. 6.
(6) See 1989 Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 243 (Penn Well Pub. Co., 1989) (4.7 million bpd in
1988).
(7) Id. (2.4 million bpd in 1988).
(8) See L o r c h , supra, note 1 at col. 6.
(9) Id., at A-7, col. 6 (suggesting a cost o f from $ 3-10 million per well).
(10) See I b r a h i m , swpra, note 3 at col. 1.
(11) On the world’s reserves see 1989 Energy Statistics Sourcebook, supra, note 6 at 123
(suggesting approximately 900 billion barrels in 1989).
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8-11 million barrels discharged from the Sea Island loading terminal (12) is
likely to be felt for years to corne (13). Before coalition forces could bomb
the pipe lines supplying the terminal (14), a slick 10 miles wide and 35 miles
long escaped into the Gulf, threatening the wide diversity of animal and
plant life located there (15).
In the event settlement of réparation claims commences pursuant to the
obligations of the United Nations’ cease-fïre resolution (16), and disposition
reflects compensation for destruction illegally inflicted (17), at least two
specifïc international légal issues will merit close considération. The fïrst
has to do with whether article 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the
Protection of Civilian Persons (Civilians Convention) (18), or article 23(g) of

(12) See A p p l e , «Relentless Tide o f Oil Fouis Shores of Empty Saudi City», N .Y. Times,
Jan. 28, 1991, A - l , col. 3 at A - 4 , col. 3.
(13) See H o i u s h a , «U.S. Companies to Join Bid to Minimize Gulf Oil Spill», N .Y . Times,
Jan. 29, 1991, at A-5, col. 1.
(14) See N .Y . Times, Jan. 28, 1991, at A-5, col. 1.
(15) See W a l d , «Currents, Not Man, W i ll Décidé the Spill’s Effects», N .Y . Times, Jan. 29,
1991, A-5, col. 3 at col. 4.
(16) U.N. Security Council Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), reprinted in 1 Dispatch 239-240 (Nov. 5,
1990) (U.S. Dept. o f State), very clearly reminded Iraq « that under international law it is liable
for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals
and corporations, as a resuit of the invasion and illégal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq ». The
April 3, 1991, Security Council Res. 687 on cease-fïre followed this by obligating Iraq to make
réparations for its illégal activities. See Resolution reprinted in 2 Dispatch 236 (Apr. 8, 1991).
(17) War claims have often been settled politically through treaties. International arbitral
settlement applying légal rules is o f comparatively recent origin. See B o r c h a r d , Diplomatie
Protection of Citizens Abroad, 248 (1915). On some early cases see R a l s t o n , Venezuelan Arbitraiions of 1903 (1904), at 762 (Petrocelli case), 900 (Bembelista case). On légal liability for war
crimes see Hague Convention IV (1907), 36 Stat. 2277, art. III ; H a n n a , «Légal Liability for
War Damage », 43, Mich. L. Rev., 1057 (1945) ; W o r m e r , Collection of International War Damage
Claims (1944). Resolution 687 provides that settlement of claims against Iraq will be conducted
under the supervision of the United Nations. Paragraph 16 of the Resolution is not clear on
whether ail the destruction flowing from the invasion is compensable simply because o f the invasion’s illégal nature. The paragraph just « réaffirma that Iraq, ..., is liable under international law
for any direct loss, damage, ..., or injury ... as a resuit of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait ». To the extent the claims against Iraq will be honored only when destruction
violated the laws of armed conflict, the parameters of that body of international law take on
genuine signifîcance.
It should also be noted that at one time there was considérable talk about war crimes trials
for Saddam Hussein and his political associâtes. Within a few weeks following the coalition vietory against Iraq, most of the public statements about war crimes trials subsided. This may have
reflected : a desire to avoid complicating the release of prisoners of war and hostages ; appréhen
sion about undermining domestic dissention within Iraq by providing Saddam Hussein with a
pan-Arab rallying point ; récognition o f the variety of foreign policy implications associated with
trials in absentia. For examples of literature conceming the wisdom of post-World War II war
crimes trials see e.g., S. G lueck, War Griminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment (1944) ;
Finch, « Rétribution for War Crimes », 37, Am. J. In t’l L M8 (1943) ; Levy, « The Law and Proce
dure of War Crime Trials », 1943, Proc. Am. Soc'y Int’l L ., 29 (1943) ; Anderson, « The Utility
of the Proposed Trial and Punishment o f Enemy Leaders», 37, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1081 (1943).
(18) T.I.A.S., No 3365, Art. 53, provides : « Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the state, or
to other public authorities, or to social or coopérative organizations is prohibited, except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military opérations».
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the régulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 (19), sets out the
applicable rule for assessing the lawfulness of Iraq’s destructive activity.
Reports of the burnings of the oil fïelds and the discharge into the Gulf did
not surface until several days after the coalition bombing campaign began
on January 17, 1991, more than fïve months into the occupation of
Kuwait (20). Thus, given the presumptively responsive nature o f the
destruction, should Iraq’s activity be j udged by the terms of a provision
dealing with behavior of an occupying power, or by the terms of one setting
forth the limits on the methods and means of military engagement ? The
second question focuses on the doctrine of military necessity and concerns
whether the destruction in Kuwait can qualify for the protection accorded
by that concept (21). Analysts have speculated Iraq discharged oil from the
Sea Island terminal to foui Saudi desalinization plants and complicate an
amphibious assault (22), while the oil fïelds were burned to deny coalition
forces access to the oil when the ground offensive began (23), secure troop
and material emplacements in Kuwait by clouding aerial conditions (24), or
cover retreat from Kuwait by the Iraqi armed forces (25). In view of the
fact the doctrine of military necessity is captured as an exemption to the
prohibition on destruction of property of both article 53 as well as
article 23(g), could any or ail of these explanations serve to exculpate Iraq
from wrong doing for which compensation would have to be made ?
This brief Comment is directed at the latter question alone, with particular attention devoted to the issue of whether appraisals of claims of
military necessity are to look beyond the obvious need to link the specific
action under considération with some legitimate military objective, and
consider, as a countervailing factor able to weaken an otherwise
appropriate reference to the defense, that the nation raising necessity was
engaged in an aggressive and illégal war from the outset. Notwithstanding
this Comment’s limited nature, it seems somewhat safe to suggest that, for
(19) 36 Stat. 2277, Art. 23(g) provides that it shall be prohibited : «T o destroy or seize the
enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war ». On article 23(g)’s applicability to public and private property, see M . M c D otjg al and
F . F e l i c i a n o , Law and Minimum World Public Order, 675, N. 454 (1961) ; G . v o n G l a ï ï n , The
Occupation of Enemy Territory, 227 (1957). Compare C. G r a b e r , The Development of the Law of
Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914, at 208 (1949) (« apparently deals with private property >>), with
2, H. L e v i e , Gode of International Armed Conflict, 766 (1986) (suggesting applicable to public
property alone).
(20) See S h e n o n , « Coalition Forces Moving Toward Kuwait Front — 10.000 Sorties », N. Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A -l, col. 6.
(21) Excellent discussions of military necessity are contained in M . M c D otjgal and
F . F e l i c i a n o , supra, note 19 at 671-679 ; G . v o n G l a h n , supra, note 19 at 224-231 ;
B. R o d r i c k , The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law, 58-82 (1928) ; D o w n e y , « The Law
of War and Military Necessity », 47, Am. J. int’l L .y 254 (1953).
(22) See S h e n o n , « Huge Slick Still a Threat to Saudi Water Plants», N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1991, at A -l, col. 3.
(23) See Tulsa World, Jan. 23, 1991, at A -l, col. 5.
(24) See S h e n o n , supra, note 20.
(25) Id.
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a variety of reasons, the answer to the former question, the question about
the applicable law, identifies the prohibition on destruction contained in
article 53 of the Civilians Convention as governing only destruction in a
case of occupation uncontested by outside military challenge (26). Once
preparatory or full-scale external military opposition to the occupation is
launched, destruction in occupied territory by the oceupying power is controlled by the prohibition reflected in article 23 (g) of the Hague régula
tions (27).

II

Iraq would seem to face substantial impediments in demonstrating the
acceptability of any of the justifications mentioned above that have been
ventured by analysts. The language of 23(g) allows departure from the
basic prohibition contained in that article whenever destruction is

(26) Iraq is a party to the Civilians Convention and is bound by its terms. The reasons for
article 53 not applying therefore have to be found elsewhere. On that matter, at îeast four such
reasons happen to exist. First, any other conclusion would be incongruent with the distinction
evidenced in the Lieber Code o f 1863, the Brussels Déclaration of 1874, the Oxford Code of 1880,
and the Hague Régulations of 1899 and 1907 between regulating periods of relative calm and
periods involving active military hostilities. That distinction has generally subjected « takings »
to greater régulation than « destruction », due to the absence o f the significant and pressing
demands surrounding the latter. Thus, a complete prohibition on destruction like that in
article 53 should be confïned to situations that have historically called forth stringent régulation.
Second, the « military opérations » exception in article 53, and the article’s placement in Part III,
Section III, entitled « Occupied Territories », rather than Part III, Section II, entitled « General
Protection of Populations Against Certain Conséquences of War », suggest a narrow reading.
Indeed, the 1949 Geneva Diplomatie Conference rejected the initial idea of including article 53’s
prohibition in the much broader Section II. See Report of Committee I I I to the Plenary Assembly,
2A, Final Record of the Diplomatie Conference of Geneva, 1949, at 812, 822 (art. 30), and 839
(art. 48A) (1949). See also comments by Du Pasquier, Switserland, id., at 721 (indicating the
prohibition be moved to avoid ambiguity with the Hague rules). See also « Report to the Con
ference from the Second Commission on the Laws and Customs of War on Land » (July 5, 1899),
reprinted in Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 137, 145 (ed. J. Scott, 1917)
(indicating article 23(g) was designed to cover hostilities, not occupation). Third, at the 31st
meeting of Committee III, the Committee with the task of preparing the Civilians Convention,
Colonel Du Pasquier, the Rapporteur, observed, against a backdrop of concern that the Commit
tee not address the laws of the land warfare, that « even if it was not possible to provide for
protection of property against bombardments or acts of an invading army ... it was necessary to
arrange for the protection of property in an occupied territory ». See, 2A, Final Record, supra,
at 719-720 (emphasis added). Finally, comments made at the 1977 Geneva Diplomatie Con
ference suggest delegates to that Conference understood the prohibition of article 53 as not
extending beyond instances of occupation uncontested by outside military challenge. See the
remarks of Mrs. Bindshedler-Robert, International Committee of the Red Cross, III, H. L e v i e ,
Protection of War Victims ; Protocol I to the 1959 Geneva Conventions, 98, para. 35 an 36 ; id.,
at 99, para. 38.
(27) Though Iraq is not a party to Hague Convention IV and its annexed Régulations, it is
bound by such as a matter o f customary international law. See, Documents on the Laws of War,
44 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff, eds., 1982) ; U.S. Army Field Manual, 27-10, paras. 6 & 7 (1956).
On article 23(g) dealing with hostilities, see Report to the Conference from the Second Commission
on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra, note 26.
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« imperatively demanded by the necessities of war» (28). In discharging oil
into the Gulf and burning oil fïelds in Kuwait, however, the standard
implicit in that language would appear to have not been met. With regard
to the burnings to keep oil from falling into the coalition’s hands (29), the
indubitable requirement for linkage (30) between the action taken and a
legitimate military objective is absent. No one can dispute the fact that
depriving the opponent’s forces of refined fuel products serves the permitted objective o f gaining a military advantage. But the trouble in this case
is that crude oil has no immediate use to invading military forces and exists
in abundance in Saudi Arabia (31), the country that acted as the staging
point for the coalition’s counter-offensive. The discharge into the Gulf to
foui Saudi desalinization plants is only slightly more troublesome, since the
language of article 23 (g) says nothing as clear about the likelihood of action
accomplishing a desired purpose as it does about it having to be tied to a
legitimate military objective. In insisting upon action imperatively
« demanded » by the necessities of war, however, 23(g) implicitly requires
something more than action akin to randomly firing in ail directions (32).
Yet in view of the unpredictability of océan currents, and the impact of
weather on the flow and direction of océan pollutants (33), the discharge
from Sea Island to foui the water works on the Saudi coast would seem

(28) See supra, note 19.
(29) See supra, note 23.
(30) It is clear that the référencé in article 23(g) to action being demanded «b y » the
necessities of war fixes the need to establish a connection between a legitimate military opération
and the action under considération. The degree of connection required is clarified by the
reference to the fact that the necessities of war must « imperatively » demand the action taken.
See generally D o w n e y , «The Law of War and Military Necessity», 4 7 , Am. J. In t’l L., 251
(1953).
(31) At the time of the launching of Opération Desert Storm, the Saudi’s were producing
approximately 9 million bpd, see G r e e n h o u s e , « OPEC Takes Up Oil Price Décision », N. Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1991, C-l, col. 3, at C-5, col. 5, from reserves estimated at 170 billion barrels, see
1989, Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 123 (Penn Well Pub., 1989), approximately 20 % of the total
world reserves. Saudi Arabia’s need to import refined fuel products is discussed in M i l l e r ,
«Saudis Importing Fuel to Fight War», N .Y . Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A-4, col. 6. This suggests
that Iraqi destruction o f refined products may stand on a different footing than the destruction
of crude oil facilities.
(32) Though outside the context of article 23(g), both the « Llandovery Castle case », Animal
Digest of In t’l Law Cases, Cas No. 235 (1923-1924) and the «Peleus case», I U.N. War Crimes
Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (hereinafter War Grimes Reports), 1 (1945)
inform the meaning of the doctrine of military necessity. The first involves the massacre of survivors of a hospital ship sunk by a German submarine in World War I. The second is factually
very similar and cornes from the Second World War. In each case the excuse offered was that
of preventing the relay of information that could jeopardize the submarine involved in the sinking. In rejecting this argument in both cases, the relavant tribunal had reference to the fact that
many other things (e.g., débris, oil slicks) could have been helpful in disclosing that kind o f infor
mation. This certainly suggests that by « necessity » is meant that one’s action must be somewhat
likely to accomplish the desired resuit.
(33) Indeed, reports circulated in the media that the discharges of crude into the Gulf were
going awry and fouling desalinization plants in Kuwait used to supply fresh water to the occupying Iraqi forces.
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hardly in a better position than the burnings to keep crude out of the coali
tion’s hands.
The justifications of hampering an amphibious assault (34), protecting
troop and material emplacements (35), and covering retreat from occupied
Kuwaiti territory (36) are much more complicated. These ail tie the
destructive actions to a legitimate military objective and pose situations
where the purpose of the action is very likely to be at least somewhat
achieved (37). It is quite possible that the evidence adduced with regard to
such justifications could demonstrate weaknesses in any Iraqi case. Ail
evidence aside, the reason the justifications are considered herein has to do
with the controversial matter of whether the concept of military necessity
reflected in article 23(g) envisions looking to see if the nation invoking the
doctrine to excuse some destructive action has been engaged in an
aggressive, illégal war from the very beginning (38). In other words, even
if we assume an extremely close link to a legitimate military objective, is
the fact that the destroying nation initiated an illégal war of aggression a
considération which is relevant under 23 (g) in determining the availability
of the excuse of military necessity. Little space has been devoted to this
matter in learned journals. Those scholars who have offered suggestions
have often done so in an oblique fashion and without articulating any
elaborate rationale (39). Perhaps this is a conséquence of the fact the
Nuremberg tribunal acquitted German officiais in two Second World War
cases involving destruction o f property in occupied territory to cover
retreat (40) without discussing the rôle of Nazi aggression (41) in evaluating
claims to the doctrine of military necessity (42).

(34) See supra, note 23.
(35) See supra, note 24.
(36) See supra, note 25.
(37) For the contention that a preexisting plan to take destructive action can undermine
reliance on military necessity as an excuse, see transcript o f « Field-Marshall von Manstein case »,
3391-3393 (1949), cited in Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 19, Brilish Y.B.
Int’l L ., 4442 at 450. n. 1 (1952).
(38) See U.N. Security Council Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), para. 8, supra, note 16, characterizing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as <tillégal ».
(39) Compare J. Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, 53 (1964) (« The
effect o f outlawing aggressive war is to remove the légal excuse ... of acts otherwise condemned
by ail pénal codes ... »), with Latjterpach t, « The Problem of the Révision of the Law of War »,
19, British Y.B. In t’l L., 360 at 378 (1953) (« most of the rules of warfare ..., operate regardless
of the legality of the war »).
(40) U.S. v. List, 11, Trials o f War Criminals, 759 (1948) ; U.S. v. von Leeb, 12, War Crimes
Report, 1 (1948).
(41) On the Nuremberg tribunal’s détermination that the Nazi’s had undertaken a war of
aggression, see Judgment of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (Oct. 1, 1946),
reprinted in 41, Am. J. In t’l L., 172 at 186-221 (1947).
(42) Putting aside the two cases referred to, it is not inconceivable that destruction in the
course of retreat from occupied territory captured through aggression could be adjudged eligible
for protection under military necessity. In this sense, the Nuremberg cases do not necessarily
reject the availability of the doctrine in every instance o f a war of aggression. The simplest
scenario making the point would involve a bloodless takeover by one state of the territory of
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The position stated in this Comment is that the fact the nation inflicting
destruction has undertaken to conduct a war of aggression is indeed a rele
vant considération which must be incorporated in the évaluation o f any
claim to military necessity (43). To be sure, however, the relevancy of the
considération is important to the extreme, but it is not the sole, decisive
considération that invariably tips the scales against the nation endeavoring
to have the action of its forces excused. The reason for this has to do with
the varying conditions under which initiating aggression can be carried ont,
the wide range of motivating factors that may precipitate the aggression,
and the broad spectrum of interests the destructive action in the occupied
territory may seek to promote.

III

In advance of setting forth the reasons which suggest the appropriateness
of this position, a few observations are in order about possible explanations
supporting the narrower, limited reading of article 23(g)’s exception. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of detailed commentary on this subject, one
can only engage in cautious, uninformed spéculation and conjecture. Yet
even recognizing this complication, a couple rational explanations for a
narrow reading do come readily to mind.
The flrst possibility is that a narrow reading is best because it avoids
placing commanding offïcers in a position of dispute with political leaders
who deliberately insist on the pursuit of clear aggressive designs against
other nations. If a plan of action for a military campaign were to be subjected to a scrutiny that included considération of the campaign’s aggressive
nature, members of the armed services charged with implementing the plan
could well find themselves wrangling with political leaders, thereby undermining the kind of discipline required to conduct warfare successfully.
The difficulty with accepting this argument is that it fails to take into
account the rejection of «superior orders» as an unqualified defense (44).
Like the explanation for the narrow reading of article 23(g), superior orders
is based on the importance of discipline within the military. From the
Nuremberg war crimes experience, it is plain that while discipline is an

another, followed by a military campaign from the outside to oust the illégal occupant. In such
a situation, it is not perverse to expect a tribunal, evaluating a claim by the occupant to excuse
destruction of property to cover a retreat, to reach the conclusion that the aggressive and illégal
nature of the initial occupation does not prevent reliance on military necessity. An approach o f
this sort would stress the bloodless nature of the original aggression as opposed to the péril to
life and limb encountered by the retreating forces, and balance these with the destruction o f
property involved in covering the retreat.
(43) See id., discussing the idea that aggression is a factor to be weighed against others, and
not something which always overwhelms ail other factors.
(44) See M . M c D otjg al and F . F e l i c i a n o , supra, note 19, at 690-699.
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extremely important value, it is to be weighed against the prescriptions of
international law on the methods and means of prosecuting armed conflict.
Thus, superior orders has not been favorably received when the act leading
to its invocation was clearly unlawful (45), or was not somehow tangibly
opposed (46). More importantly, it has not mattered that the order
involved was that o f a political official rather than a military officer (47).
Especially in view of the mere potential for disputes between commanding
officers and political leaders having had no determinative influence in the
context of superior orders, it would be unusual to accord it such influence
under the exception of article 23(g). Just as an order clearly violative of the
laws of war cannot serve as the basis for a defense under superior orders,
so too destruction inflicted in the context of a war that is clearly aggressive
cannot earn protection on the basis of the exception for destruction
« imperatively demanded by the necessities of war » (48). I f the value of
military discipline alone is insufficiënt to assure that invocation o f superior
orders will insulate the claimant where it is plain that an act in contraven
tion of the laws of war has been commanded, then that value should be
equally as insufficiënt to assure protection of destructive acts taken during
the course of any war that is plainly and obviously one of aggression (49).
A second possible explanation for reading article 23(g)’s reference to
military necessity narrowly enough to exclude considération of the legality
of the overall conflict in which the destruction at issue has occurred, con
cerns the irrationality of war itself. In view of that basic fact, it would
seem perfectly sensible for any reasoning person to conclude that
incongruity would arise if the rules o f armed conflict were interpreted as

(45) For cases accepting this proposition see «Trial of Wielen», 11, War Grimes Reports, at
47 (1947) ; « Trial of Renoth », I d at 78 (1946) ; « Peleus », swpra, note 32, at 16 et seq. (1945).
From the First World War, see «The Llandovery Castle», supra, note 32, at 437-438, where it
is stated that « if ... an order is universally known to everybody, ..., to be without any doubt
whatever against the law », then superior orders is no defense.
(46) «The Einsatzgruppen Case », 4, Trials of War Criminals, at 481 (1947), require that one
invoking superior orders must not have been « in accord with the principle and intent of the
superior»; it is not enough to just «rebel mentally». See «Trial of Bauer», 8, War Crimes
Reportst at 16 and 21 (1945), for an example of the kind of showing of opposition required.
(47) See « Judgment of the International Military Tribunal » (Nuremberg), supra, note 41, at
221 (referring to article 8 of the IMT Charter).
(48) It is recognized that this conclusion has ramifications far beyond that o f destruction
inflicted by an occupying power in occupied territory. Since article 23(g) deals with destruction
of property during military engagement, to say that the aggressive nature of a war affects the
destruction the aggressor can take admit® that every single act of destruction taken — and not
just those in occupied territory inflicted when the aggressor has its status as a occupant
challenged — is subject to examination in light of the illégal nature of the war. However, this
factor alone is not dispositive. Just as it may be that one could determine that destruction to
cover a retreat from territory occupied through a bloodless invasion may be permissible, see
supra, note 42, so too it may be that destruction to cover a retreat ordered by a commanding
official who defïes directives from political and military superiors to push formard with the cam
paign of aggression may be permissible.
(49) For a statement on what constitutes « aggression », see « Consensus of Définition of
Aggression», G.A. Res. 3314, 29, U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 at 142 (1974).
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imposing anything more than the most rudimentary of constraints. Régula
tion of atavistic activity typifying the quintessence of human émotion and
frustration, and the antithesis o f human logic and temperance, should
demand nothing but simple, practical connections between military objec
tives and the methods selected for accomplishing them.
As with the fïrst argument for a narrow reading, the instant position,
too, has problems which make it unconvincing. Most pronounced is the fact
that article 23(g) itself already reflects expectations regarding rationality.
By prohibiting destruction which is not essential to attain some legitimate
military objective, it requires that armed forces engaged in destruction
refrain from the senseless and unnecessary savagery that conflict might
otherwise tend to precipitate. l ’or a particular act to merit protection, it
must not only be claimed as linked to a legitimate military objective but
shown to be likely to accomplish the objective itself (50). This requirement
imposes a duty on decisionmakers in the fïeld to consider carefully the
means selected for prosecuting war (51). Less pronounced, but also evidencing concern with rationality, is the fact that Hague régulation 23(g) even
applies to full-scale conflict outside occupied territories (52). Yet if the irrationality of war supported a narrow reading of the article’s exception, it
would seem the provision and its requirement that destruction be tied to
a military objective likely to be accomplished would not have been
extended to encompass situations of that sort. Such incontestable imposi
tions o f rationality suggest it is not at ail out of character with the thrust
of 23(g) to read the concept of military necessity as alluding to whether the
nation whose forces inflicted the destruction at issue initiated a war of
aggression. To the extent that this reading fixes on commanding offïcers an
obligation to proceed in a measured and reasoned fashion, it serves to
transform the ultimate in human irrationality in no way not already dictated by the very terms of article 23 of the régulations annexed to Hague
Convention IV.
The third and final possible argument in favor of a narrow reading of
military necessity is associated with the preceding two by virtue of its
pragmatic nature. Like the others, it claims that 23(g)’s exception is to be
given a restricted interprétation because that fits best with the realities
surrounding international conflict. But rather than developing the notion
of a broad reading creating tensions between military and political players,
or incongruity with the fundamental nature of war, this argument centers
in on the potential for capricious and abusive déterminations by victors
(50) See fcext accompanying supra, notes 28-32.
(51) Contrast this with Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier, which basically postulâtes that the
existence of war overrides ail légal limita. The theory is summoned up in the statement inter
arma silent leges. See O ’B r i e n , «The meaning o f Military Necessity in International Law», 1,
World Polity, 109 119-127 (1957) (discussing the theory of Kriegsraison).
(52) See supra, note 27.
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who sit in judgment of the vanquished. The idea is that any tribunal comprised of those prevailing in war, and called upon to assess the propriety
of acts of destruction inflicted by those who have been defeated, is very
likely to frnd the existence of a war of aggression, thus complicating the
possibility of military necessity ever being successfully invoked.
The weakness in this argument is not its logic, for one would expect that
the normal human reaction to another who has compelled it to grudgingly
draw on its valued economic and personal resources would be disgust and
contempt. The weakness resides rather in the fact that this third possibility
fails to evidence an appréciation of the structural forces which affect inter
national decisionmaking. Most importantly in this respect is reciprocity.
The reciprocal nature of relations in the international arena serves, as in
every area of human interaction, to moderate the inclination towards abuse
by those evaluating the conduct of others. Fully cognizant that in the
future they may find themselves in the docket, nations emerging victorious
from an international conflict are likely to be as interested in justice and
fairness, and rules that promote such, as in rétribution for hardships they
havé been compelled to endure. In spinning the full web of law outlined by
the starkly skeletal rules of armed conflict, the reality that what is proffered could well be used to evaluate the future conduct of the one by whom
it is proffered acts as a powerful incentive to impartiality and even-handedness. Though the victor may face strong pressures to exact a price from the
vanquished, the pressures are often checked by the longer-term perspective
imparted through the processes surrounding the making of international
décisions (53).

IV

A variety of reasons exist for interpreting article 23(g)’s exception for
destruction necessitated by the imperatives of war as including considéra
tion of the legality of the overall conflict started by the nation whose forces
inflicted the destruction in dispute. Briefly stated, the reasons can be said
to be based on the concept of reasonableness, the perversity o f results
grounded in a narrow reading, the textual analysis of the terminology used
to express the military necessity exception, and the implications gleaned
from other language appearing in both the Hague régulations and Conven
tion IV to which the régulations are annexed. The first two of these reasons
could be categorized as pragmatic, in the sense that their focus is resuit-

(53)
For reference to the nature o f the international decisionmaking process, see M a l l i s on
and M à l l i s o n , « The Judicial Status of Irregular Combatants under the International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict », 9, Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., 39, 40-43 (1977) ; S o l f and
C u m m i n g s , «A Survey of Pénal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of
August», 12, 1949, id., at 205.
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oriented, and the last two as traditional, in that they turn on the very
language of the international compact of concern.
The pragmatic explanation based on reasonableness seeks to construe the
exception of article 23 (g) as ail principles of international law are to be construed, in a manner which yields a sensible and useful end product. The
concept of reasonableness is not at ail foreign to either the common law (54)
or the civil law (55) systems. Stripped of the doctrinal coatings making it
legally palatable, its emphasis is on viewing rules of law as normative
devices for securing goals thought by decisionmakers to be compelling. In
its most unadorned form, reasonableness conceives of law as the handmaiden, not the master, of society. Law serves not to paralyze the ability
to make the moral judgments implicit in ail décisions of social policy, but
rather to facilitate the making of décisions in a manner that reflects such
judgments. From this type of perspective, interprétations regarding the
provisions of international law regulating armed conflict tend towards the
production of results that serve the socially essential goal of promoting lawobservance and discouraging law-violation.
The utility of the concept of reasonableness in understanding the meaning of légal standards is apparent in international jurisprudence. To begin
with, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (56) provides that the
language of international agreements is normally to be given its ordinary
meaning (57). However, in the event that approach results in a meaning
which is obviously not reasonable, recourse may be had to means of inter
prétation designed to correct that situation (58). Reasonableness has also
been claimed in the opinions of some of the justices of the I.C.J. as a vital
considération when construing fundamental légal documents (59). Indeed,
in both the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (60), and the more recent

(54) See e.g., Schenck v. U.S., 249, U.S., 47 (1919) (meaning of a clear constitutional provision
affected by reasonableness) ; Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566, P.2d, 725 (1977) (resolving dispute not
controlled by antecedent common law rules in accordance with balancing approach) ; State v.
Shack, 277, A.2d, 369 (1971) (meaning of a clear statutory provision affected by reasonableness).
(55) Compania Swift De La Pluta, Frigorifica, Creditor’s Proceeding, Sup. Ct. o f Argentina,
Sept. 4, 1973, translation reprinted in, 6, Lawyer Am., 330 (1974) (understanding the nature o f
law from the social objectives it seeks to secure).
(56) U.N. Doc. A/GONÎ'. 39/27 (1969), entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980, reprinted in 63, Am.
J. int’l L., 875 (1969).
(57) Id., art. 31.
(58) Id., art. 32.
(59) See J. A z e v e d o ’s dissent in «Advisory Opinion Concerning the Compétence o f the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations », 1959, I.C.J., 4, 23, where
he says about interprétations of the U.N. Charter that : « To comply with its aims one must seek
the methods o f interprétation most likely to serve the natural évolution of the needs of
mankind » (Emphasis added). As alluded to above, reasonableness is integrally connected with
mankind’s needs.
(60) United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951, I.C.J., 128, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18) (the surrounding realities must serve as the backdrop against which international law is to be understood).
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1984 Gulf of Maine Case (61), the I.C.J. itself appeared somewhat sympathetic to the notion of viewing law against a backdrop of reasonableness.
The opinions of the Court in those cases seem to emphasize the influence
of contextual factors on the international rules governing the conduct of
nations. Additionally, leading scholars in the field stress the rôle of
reasonableness. Some are explicit in their insistence that rules of law
regulating the use of force be considered in light of reasonableness (62),
while others seem to endorse the idea that factors subsumed by reasonable
ness have a privileged status in the formation of international law (63).
Finally, the Vienna Convention, the intimations from the I.C.J., and the
positions of respected scholars illustrate a primordial fact about ail law. As
expressed long ago by the renowned English légal historian Sir Henry Summer Maine, from the very beginning the rules that comprise law have
reflected not some antecedent directive mankind is helpless to avoid, but
rather a judgment about how best to achieve the ambitions society sets
before itself (64). Récognition of this fundamental fact casts a new light on
every légal rule. For if law is to assist in the securing of a community’s
goals, then it must be understood as directing behavior and establishing
standards reasonably suited to its task.
But how does one move from sensitivity to the importance of reasonable
ness, to the conclusion that article 23(g)’s exception for destruction
demanded by the necessities of war is to be construed so as to consider the
legality of the overall conflict in which the destruction at issue has
occurred ? This is where the second of the two pragmatic explanations
cornes in. In short, the basic idea is that a narrow reading of 23(g) produces
the kind of unreasonable resuit that a broad reading is fully able to avoid.
With regard to the untoward nature o f the resuit produced by interpreting the military necessity doctrine of article 23(g) so as to preclude
reference to the legality of the overall conflict, it is apparent that anytime
one nation can invade another and then, to secure its position and insure
the fruits of its lawlessness are Consolidated, destroy property located there
by merely establishing a link to a legitimate military objective, the lawabiding members of the world community are likely to fînd themselves
seriously disadvantaged. Once dug in, an adversàry is often incredibly difficult to oust. Challenging military forces not only have to contend with the
same obstacles that every combatant faces when engaged in battle on the
(61) Canada v. U.S., 1984, I.C.J., 246 (Décision of Oct. 12) (antecedent equitable criteria are
those producing an equitable resuit).
(62) See M . M c D otjg al and F . F e l i c i a n o , supra, note 19 at 218 («reasonableness in particular context», suggested in regard to article 51 of the U.N. Charter). See also F a l k , «The
Beirut Raid in the International Law o f Retaliation », 63, Am. J. Int’l L 415 at 437-39.
(63) C. D e V i s s c h e h , Theory and Reality in Public International Law, 157 (Corbett trans. rev.
ed. 1968) (speaking of « social ends considered desirable » in the context of the formation of
customary law).
(64) H . M a i n e , Ancient Laxot 3-17 (originally pub., 1861) (The World’s Classics, ed. 1931).
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open field, but they also have to overcome superior positions associated
with defensive entrenchment. In the event the illegality of an invasion does
not function to moderate the destruction an occupying power can inflict to
maintain its position, the task facing an opponent can be complicated substantially (65). In an effort to confound a challenger, the occupying power
could systematically destroy property in the occupied territory, thereby
increasing the likelihood that opposition to the aggression would prove
unsuccessful.
When the exception for destruction demanded by military necessity is
given a reading which envisions reference to the existence of a war of
aggression, a nation occupying another through the use of illégal force finds
itself unable freely to have recourse to article 23(g) to justify destruction
inflicted in the face of an external challenge. Aggression and occupation
may put the foreign belligerent in a position of being able to strengthen its
defenses against efforts to remove it, thus adding to the difficulties a
challenger would otherwise face on the open field. The fact the occupation
is the conséquence of a use of force in contravention of international law,
however, fonctions to undermine the ability to invoke 23(g) to protect
every act of destruction. The resuit is to place lawless aggression in proper
rank with the law-abiding behavior o f the other members of the world community. Uses of force perceived as unacceptable by international standards
can be addressed without other rules of law being adverted to in order to
protect the fruits of illegality.
One additional point bears reference here as well. Specifically, construing
military necessity as including considération of the legality of the overall
conflict goes beyond simply producing a more reasonable resuit as regards
acclaiming the importance of law-abiding behavior and decrying law viola
tion. As already alluded to, the exception in article 23(g) for destruction
demanded by the necessities o f war imposes a modicum o f rationality on
an otherwise irrational manifestation of human émotion (66). To the extent
that reasonableness connotes an approach directed at a rational resuit, a
broad reading of 23(g) is certainly more harmonious with the ténor of the
military necessity exception. A narrow reading, which leaves aside the mat
ter of the war’s legality, seems somehow out-of-line.
Moving away from the two pragmatic reasons for a broad interprétation,
and in the direction of the two traditional reasons, attention is called to the

(65) As is well known, Iraq was quickly ousted from Kuwait, a country it had occupied for
almost seven months. Nonetheless, recent remarks of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, com
mander o f the coalition forces in the Gulf, suggest that had the Iraqi armed forces avoided concentrating combat units in Kuwait itself, a flanking effort would have been much more difficult,
and, because of the préparations for combat in Kuwait, a consequent ground campaign would
have been longer, more complex, and much costlier. Interview by David Frost with Gen.
Schwarzkopf, PBS (aired Mar.29, 1991).
(66) See text accompanying supra, notes 54-64.
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very terms used to express article 23(g)’s exception. The language of
relevancy speaks of destruction imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war. Since this is quite different from phraseology that would have substituted the word «for» in lieu of the préposition «of», it might be concluded that the exception makes clear a preference for a construction giving
no weight to whether the overall conflict was one of aggression. However,
that conclusion should not be reached in haste. It is obvious that reference
to destruction demanded by the « necessities for war » would make it easier
to argue that the legality of the conflict is a relevant considération. None
theless, use of such language would have had the effect of weakening the
position that the permissibility of destruction also turns on its necessity
from a purely operational standpoint. In other words, were 23(g) to speak
of the necessities « for », rather than « o f », war, any reference to the matter
of some particular military opération demanding the destruction would be
inappropriate.
Reading the verbal configuration which actually appears in article 23(g)
in a fashion that can support a broad construction may be accomplished,
especially in view of the influence of reasonableness, without having to
engage in acrobaties that too substantially twists the understanding of
what certain words convey. In permitting destruction, the Hague rules use
of the préposition « of » has meaning only in reference to the « necessities »
that have « imperatively demanded » action of that unfortunate character.
That it must be the extant « necessities » driving the destruction clearly
suggests considération of the exigencies at the very moment the act is
taken. Just as clearly, however, since those exigencies are themselves con
comitants of ail the circumstances surrounding the initial use of force
precipitating the war itself, the most complete picture of the existing
« necessities » would seem to include the latter circumstances as well. What
enhances the attractiveness o f this position is that the necessities able to
justify destruction must be those which render such action « imperatively
demanded ». This is a strict standard, undoubtedly requiring linkages of the
sort discussed earlier (67). Beyond that, however, enough flexibility is
incorporated by the standard to allow considération of whether the nation
inflicting the destruction engaged in a war of aggression. The fact a
demand must be imperative, if it is to be sufficiënt to support destruction,
invites reference to a broad spectrum of considérations. Déterminations of
the imperativeness of any demand that prove the most teeming with
insight, significance, and perspective, reflect on the widest range of con
sidérations available. It would be far too parsimonious to comprehend the
expression «imperatively demanded» in any way other than that which
reflects on the legality of the overall-conflict in which the destruction in
issue has occurred.
(67) See text accompanying supra, notes 28-33.
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The final reason for supporting a broad reading o f article 23(g) is also
based on text. To this extent, it fits the traditional, conventional mold just
as well as the reason drawing on the spécifié terminology of military
necessity happens to fit that mold. The différence between the two resides
in the directness o f the evidence upon which they draw. The latter arrives
at its conclusions with regard to the meaning of « imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war » by virtue of deciphering the words themselves.
Nothing could be more direct. In the case of the former, though, a more
circuitous route is utilized. In essence, movement is from the language
situated in other provisions of the Hague régulations, and Convention IV
itself, to interprétation of article 23(g)’s exception. By no stretch of the
imagination could this effort be conceived of as anything but inferential
and indirect.
The most significant of the textual evidences implying a broad reading
of 23(g) concerns the understanding that the rules of conduct established
by the Hague régulations reflect what is acceptable behavior, even after
military necessity has been considered. The Nuremberg war crimes tribunal
made that point in its statement that the Hague prohibitions « are superior
to military necessities of the most urgent nature except where the Régula
tions themselves provide the contrary » (68). This depicts the Hague rules
as already reflecting what military necessity allows or prohibits. The only
variation is when the rides themselves explicitly qualify a prohibition, as
in article 23(g), by express reference to the concept of necessity (69). In
cases of that sort, the prohibition thus qualified is susceptible to being
departed from if necessity is shown to exist. At bottom, this ail means that
if the prohibitions contained in the Hague rules that are not so qualified
outlaw conduct which can be linked to military objectives likely to be
accomplished by the conduct, then the very concept of military necessity
must be inescapably understood as encompassing considérations far beyond
mere linkage. The task then becomes one of simply winnowing the
prohibitory provisions of the Hague rules to ascertain if there exist prohibi
tions on conduct that can be tied to military objectives likely to be accom
plished. For if such are present, then whether military necessity is to be
construed as including reference to more than linkage alone is answered
indirectly.
The provisions in the Hague régulations of 1907 prohibiting activity
which can be connected to military objectives likely to be accomplished are
almost too numerous to count. The most important and représentative
include not forcing prisoners of war (70) or inhabitants of occupied

(68) «Trial of List» (The Hostages Case), 8, War Crimes Reports, at 69 (1948).
(69) Necessity also appears in arts. 27, 33 and 54 of the Hague Régulations.
(70) See Hague Régulations, supra, notes 19 at art. 6.
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territory (71) to engage in tasks associated with the opérations of war ; not
forcing inhabitants of occupied territory to supply information about the
army of the other belligerent (72) ; not abusing the use of a flag of truce
or the uniform of the enemy (73) ; not employing poison or poisoned
weapons (74) or killing enemy soldiers who have surrendered (75). In each
of these cases, there would be distinct military advantages that could be
gained through violating the relevant restriction. By prohibiting such con
duct, the Hague rules indicate that military necessity gives thought to a
far wider range of considérations than linkage and likelihood of accomplishing military objectives.
Additional indirect evidence corroborâtes the idea of the prohibitions in
the Hague rules implying that, where military necessity is expressly
referred to, a broad reading is appropriate. Specifîcally, paragraph 5 of the
Preamble to Hague Convention IV alludes to the values of humanitarianism and military necessity. This appears through a counterpositioning of « the desire to diminish the evils of war », and the notion of a diminu
tion « so far as» military requirements « permit » (76). Obviously, with
regard to the activities involved in the prohibitions discussed above, the
concept of necessity, a concept reflected in the formulation of the prohibi
tions, is outweighed by the interest in reducing the effeets of war. Given
that the Convention both recognizes these two compétitive values and sets
forth instances where military requirements are not seen as preeminent to
ameliorating the conséquences of war, it is quite reasonable to expect other
cases in which humanitarianism may overshadow arguments for permitting
armed forces to engage in conduct serving militarily useful purposes. If
standards for civility in the prosecution of combat do not envision permit
ting activity having a clear connection with military objectives when
necessity is incorporated in the standards, then standards that are
explicitly conditioned by necessity should be understood in precisely the
same way. Just as humanitarianism compels avoidance of the kinds of con
duct enumerated throughout the Hague régulations of 1907, so too in some
instances it may compel the avoidance of property destruction because the
inflicting army represents a nation engaged in a war of aggression. In both,
the mere fact the conduct facilitâtes the accomplishment of a military
objective is insufficiënt to support its legality.

(71) Id., at art. 52.
(72) Id., at art. 44.
(73) Id., at art. 23(f).
(74) Id., at art. 23(a).
(75) Id., at art. 23(c).
(76) Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reprinted in
The Laws of Armed Conflict, 57 at 63-64 (1). Schindler and J. Toman, eds., 1973).
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V

The invasion of the tiny Gulf sheikdom of Kuwait by the armed forces
of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein presented a variety of international
légal issues ranging from the inviolability of diplomatie premises to the
protection of art treasures (77), damage to the environment (78) to inter
vention to protect the minority Kurdish population from inhumane treatment (79). The principal issue surrounding the destruction of Kuwait’s oil
resources, in response to coalition efforts eventually ousting the occupying
Iraqi army, involves considération of Iraq’s aggression in determining
whether the destruction was « imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war ». What has been argued in the preceding pages is that the existence
of illégal aggression undermines the ability of the destroying power to
appropriately invoke military necessity as a basis for justification. The doc
trine of necessity captured by the language of article 23(g) of the Hague
régulations o f 1907 envisions reference to the illégal nature of the overall
conflict in deciding when destruction of property is permissible. Thus, with
regard to réparations called for under Security Council Resolution 687,
payments calculated on the basis of non-protected destruction must look
far beyond what traditionally has been deemed sufficiënt.

(77) For a review of some of these fcopics see, M e r o n , «Prisoners of War, Civilians and
Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis», 85, Am. J. int’l L., 104 (1991).
(78) See e.g., articles 53-55 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, reprinted in «Documents on the Laws of War», mpra, note 27, at 416-418. The Protocol
was opened for signature on Dec. 12, 1977. On its current status see A l d b i c h , « Prospects of
United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions», 85, Am.
J. Int’l L .t 1 (1991), at 3 (Iraq not a party), 19 (question o f customary law problematic).
(79) See e.g. R i d i n g , « Europeans Urging Enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq », N .Y . Times,
Apr. 9, 1991, A -l, col. 6 ; T y l e r , «Bush Sees Accord on ‘ Safe Havens’ For Kurds in Iraq», N .Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1991, A-3, col. 4 ; S o i o l i n o , «Iraq Says U.N. Must Take Over Camps for
Kurds», N .Y . Times, Apr. 24, 1991, A-6, col. 3 ; «A Lifeline in Iraq», Newsweek, Apr. 29, 1991,
at 18-21.

